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INTRODUCTION
We are in the middle of a ‘personal data gold rush’ driven
by the dominance of advertising as the primary source
of revenue for most online companies. Internet services,
advertisers, and even governments are all casting a wide
net to accumulate personal data about individuals. This
accumulation is generally occurring with minimal consid-
eration of us, the individuals at the heart of this process.
Governments and regulatory bodies, such as the Euro-
pean Union, have attempted to impose regulatory frame-
works that force the market to recognise certain rights
of individuals. Unfortunately, legal systems are not suf-
ficiently agile to keep up with the rapid pace of change
in this area. Self-regulation proposals such as the Do
Not Track headers1 have been ineffective in reducing be-
havioural targeting and advertising. For example, in a
2012 study by Balebako et al. [1], only two of the thou-
sands of existing advertising agencies had agreed to re-
spect the headers. This number has since grown to 20,2
but this remains an insignificant fraction of such ser-
vices [6]. Fundamentally, imposing constraints that ig-
nore the interests of advertisers and analytics providers,
in many cases the business models that drive “free” web
services and mobile apps, is likely to fail [12, 26]. This
further reinforces the notion that if you are not paying
for it, you are the product.3
A range of personal data technology startups have been
formed in recent years, in response to growing public
awareness about how our data is processed. These aim
to put users explicitly in control of their personal data
(or metadata, see openPDS [3]), providing platforms
through which they can permit advertisers and content
providers to enjoy metered access to valuable personal
data. In exchange, participating users could potentially
benefit by receiving a portion of the monetary value
generated from their data as it is traded in an increas-
ingly complex ecosystem [6]. Unfortunately, all these
approaches provide both a logical and a physical single
point of control over our personal data: typically, they
1http://donottrack.us/
2http://donottrack.us/implementations
3Although nothing precludes being both a paying customer
and the product being sold.
entail lodging information in the cloud where the service
is running. This naturally leads to a host of trust issues
for users, who find themselves not just having to trust
the service directly but also the infrastructure providers
involved, other parties such as local law enforcement in
the specific jurisdiction, and the possibility of collusion
between these cloud services to build ever more detailed
models of individuals.
Individuals’ responses to this are largely complex and
context dependent [4]: for example, Westin classifies
people by whether they are privacy unconcerned, pri-
vacy fundamentalists, or privacy pragmatists [27]. He
finds that 16% are unconcerned, 24% are fundamental-
ist, and 60% of all respondents fall into the last category,
where attitudes to privacy are dependent on a wide range
of specifics such as the particular data and its relevance,
the industry involved, and so on. Though this form of
classification has been recently challenged [25], in essence
it demonstrates that ‘personal data’ is inherently social:
it is generally not a practical response to decide to with-
draw completely from all online activity.
We propose there is a need for a technical platform en-
abling people to engage with the collection, management
and consumption of personal data; and that this plat-
form should itself be personal, under the direct control
of the individual whose data it holds.4 In what follows,
we refer to this platform as the Databox, a personal,
networked service that collates personal data and can be
used to make those data available. While your Databox
is likely to be a virtual platform, in that it will involve
multiple devices and services, at least one instance of
it will exist in physical form such as on a physical form-
factor computing device with associated storage and net-
working, such as a home hub.
WHY DO WE NEED A DATABOX?
Today, many businesses rely on personal data while
many services (notably online social networks) operate as
walled gardens — increasing lock-in and network exter-
nalities are preventing formation of a truly competitive
market. In addition, regular data leakages and the pri-
vacy issues of cloud-based data silos (see recent media
reports concerning account data and password leakage
by Dropbox and Skype), the opaque nature of data infer-
ences constructed by advertising agencies, and the trade
of cookies and personal data between third parties, all
call for means to index and control our ever-increasing
portfolio of personal data.
4We accept that the notion of individual ownership of a fun-
damentally shared asset such as data is itself problematic,
and we will discuss this in more detail subsequently.
The sheer amount of activity in this sector suggests that
there is at least some unmet need here, though it is per-
haps less clear precisely what that is. In particular, why
would we each want a Databox. One very practical mo-
tivation is the range of privacy threats that arise due
to, for example, the range and reach of the information
being stored about us by third-party websites [6].5 This
is in addition to privacy threats from data aggregators
over which users have no control, including government
agencies interested in surveillance such as the NSA and
GCHQ, advertisers and credit scoring companies.
More importantly, one of the benefits of having a
Databox system would be to enable a decentralised plat-
form that other developers can target to provide services
and software on. In the current world of centralised si-
los, all Independent Software Vendors (ISV) are at the
whim of the large platform and API providers. Users and
ISVs suffer whenever there is a conflict of interest with
those providers, which hampers innovation and can dis-
tort markets. Platforms like the Databox will not replace
dedicated, application-specific services such as Facebook
and Gmail, and neither are they oriented solely towards
privacy, and the prevention of activities involving per-
sonal data. Rather, they enable new applications able
to combine data from many silos to draw inferences un-
available in the existing marketplace. At the same time,
they provide for the HDI concepts of legibility, agency
and negotiability, going some way to redress the highly
asymmetric power relationship that pertains currently in
the personal data ecosystem. This potentially opens up
a range of market and social approaches to the ways in
which we conceive of, manage and exploit “our” data.
A host of other motivations and uses for such a Databox
have been presented elsewhere [20, 17, 8]. These include
privacy-preserving advertising, market research, health
applications, Quantified Self, and personal archives. In-
deed, an alternative, or additional, regulatory response
in form of interventions could lead to increased compe-
tition in the data market. In aggregate, these examples
point to a need for individuals to have tools that allow
them to take more explicit control over the collection
and consumption of their data and the information in-
ferred from their online activities. However, given the
reliance of the existing web ecosystem on the use of per-
sonal data, it is important that evolutionary paths are
available to enable the ecosystem to survive. For ex-
ample, control mechanisms may include the ability for
individuals to sell or donate their data, in whole or in
part [11].
Mapping these motivations to the Human-Data Interac-
tion model [18], we each need a point-of-presence in this
data ecology, providing:
• Legibility. The ability to collate, inspect and reflect
on “our” data, so we can understand what data is
being collected and how it is being processed.
5That is, websites that we do not interact with explicitly but
which are invoked by ‘first party‘ websites we actually visit.
• Agency. The ability to control and manage “our”
data and access to it, so we can have the capacity to
act effectively in these systems as we see fit.
• Negotiability. The ability to continually navigate
our way through the ways that data is social in con-
struction and use (consider how little of “your” data
concerns only you and no-one else).
However, in providing these mechanisms it is critical
to realise the enormous heterogeneity in users and at-
titudes: while some will want detailed engagement with
many forms and uses of their data, others will not care.
Thus the last point, negotiability, is key: ways in which
we can set and manage policies expressing what we want
to happen and providing a way to negotiate with other
involved subjects, that we can interact with and mutate
over time is at least as important as the more obvious
requirements for mechanisms allowing us to see what is
known and used about us, and to control the collection
and use of such data.
WHAT IS A DATABOX?
So just what is a Databox? That is, what are the features
and capabilities that one should provide? We divide our
answer into four parts: it must be a trusted platform pro-
viding facilities for data management of data at rest for
the data subjects as well as controlled access for other
parties wishing to use their data, and supporting incen-
tives for all parties.
Trusted Platform
Your Databox sits at the heart of your online presence.
It captures, indexes, stores and manages data about you
and data generated by you. To do so, you will have
to trust it a great deal. As well as manually adding
data and indexes into your Databox, data can be inferred
from a variety of sources such as installed apps, brows-
ing habits and online behaviour, in a privacy-conscious
manner. This potentially makes it a much more knowl-
edgeable and intrusive system (albeit more useful), when
compared to traditional data silos such as Amazon, Spo-
tify and Google, and thus imposes requirements to pro-
tect users’ privacy [10].
Trust in the platform also requires reliable behaviour as a
piece of infrastructure. That is, a Databox must be con-
sistently available so that it can usefully help the user
manage their online interactions. At the same time it
must provide straightforward means for the user to in-
tervene in the data collection and sharing operations it
is carrying out, to prevent breach in cases where auto-
matic actions derived from configuration and policy have
unforeseen consequences.
Finally, all of these actions and behaviours must be
supported by pervasive logging, with associated tools,
so that users and (potentially) third-party auditors can
build trust that the system is operating as expected and,
should something unforeseen happen, the results can at
least be tracked.
Controlled Access
The purpose of a Databox is not simply to gather all your
personal data into one place, but to enable controlled
access to that data. By this we mean that it must be se-
lectively query-able: users should have fine-grained con-
trol over what data are made available to third parties.
More complex possibilities include supporting privacy-
preserving data analytics techniques such as differential
privacy [5] and homomorphic encryption [21].
One important factor, often fleetingly considered (if at
all!) by current systems, is the need to control the ac-
cess period on a per-case basis. Specifically, the need
to revoke previously granted access. In a system where
access is granted to process data locally but not to take
copies of data, this is relatively straightforward [16]; but
in a system where data is, by default, copied out to the
third-party, cooperation on their part is required to im-
plement something like a time-to-live function for data.
A challenge in this space is the difficulty in measuring
the impact of release of any given datum as it will be
difficult at best for the Databox to maintain or other-
wise obtain the existing and future information-states of
all potential third parties that might access the newly
released datum.
Data Management
As well as collating your data and providing means for
granting controlled access to them, a Databox must pro-
vide means for users to interact with and reflect upon the
data it contains. This will enable users to make more in-
formed decisions about the behaviours they implement,
whether directly themselves or indirectly by passing off
control to others.
As part of these interactions, and to support trust in
the platform, users must be able to edit and delete data
from their Databox as a way to handle the inevitable
cases where bad data is uncovered or discovered to have
been inferred and distributed. Similarly, it may be ap-
propriate for some data and desirable for some users to
have the Databox not exhibit the usual digital tendency
of perfect record. Means to enable the Databox auto-
matically to forget data that are no longer relevant or
have become untrue may act as another factor increas-
ing trust in the platform by users [15]. Even if data
has previously been used, it may still need to be ‘put
beyond use’ by users who wish to redact it for the fu-
ture [2]. Such local and global concepts as the Right to
be Forgotten require adherence to agreed protocols. and
other forms of cooperation, by third-party services and
data aggregators.
Supporting Incentives
Development of innovative uses of personal data requires
incentives. A consequence of the controlled access envi-
sioned above is that users may choose to deny third-party
services (e.g., advertisers or cloud service providers) ac-
cess to their data. In the simplest case this might lead
to those users simply no longer being able to make use of
those services. However, a more acceptable and scalable
option would rather be to provide means for those ser-
vices to charge the user in other ways: those who wish to
pay through access to their data may do so, while those
who do not may pay through more traditional mone-
tary means. That is, the Databox must be able to ‘talk
money’, enabling users to trace payments alongside data
flow to and from different third-party services, available
via some form of app store.
The Databox could also act as an exposure reduction
mechanism for commercial organisations which may no
longer intend to hold and control a range of private data
directly (e.g., health records), and rather let the data
subject take control of their sensitive information. The
commercial organisation could still access and query the
data as previously described. This is particularly rele-
vant for international organisations that otherwise have
to be aware of a plethora of legal frameworks. An anal-
ogy might be the way online stores use third-party pay-
ment services such as PayPal or Google Wallet to avoid
the overhead of Payment Card Infrastructure compli-
ance6 for processing credit card fees.
WHAT’S IN THE DATABOX?
As soon as one begins to examine the requirements for
a Databox, one thing becomes very clear: data is a dan-
gerous word. In particular, personal data is so complex
and rich that treating it homogeneously is almost al-
ways a mistake. Various of the authors have attempted
at various times to collate their digital footprints, and
it proves a remarkably complex task. Subsequently de-
ciding which devices should be able to share in and ac-
cess the digital footprint, even before considering sharing
with other people, makes it even harder. Issues such as
mixed data formats (potentially proprietary), high vari-
ability in datum sizes, the multiplicity of standards for
authentication to different systems to retrieve data (even
within a single sector, e.g., banking), lack of standard
data processing pipelines and tools, and myriad other
reasons make this job infinitely fiddly – none of these
problems are inherently difficult but actually assembling
and then maintaining the tools and data together in-
evitably takes considerable time and effort.
By way of example, one of the authors recently went
through this exercise again. The (partial) footprint that
resulted is over 55GB in size, with data from different
sources spanning times from yesterday to over 10 years
ago. Data types recovered include:
• Communications. Email, Instant Messaging (over
6 services, some of which accounts have been idle for
several years), phone call records, SMS exchanges.
• Financial. Bank statements (both personal and
joint accounts), credit card statements, housing con-
tracts/mortgage details.
6Payment Card Infrastructure standards,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
• Family. Photographs (some of which contain family,
some contain location metadata), trips, household en-
ergy consumption, shared calendars, children’s health
records.
• Individual. Personal location traces, personal calen-
dars, address books, sleep tracking data.
• Online Social Networks. The usual candidates
(Twitter, Facebook, Google+) as well as those no
longer in existence (Orkut).
This data is initially collated on a reasonably powerful
computer, with ample storage, CPU, and memory. But
access to this data is desirable from a range of other
devices including remote machines, tablets, and smart-
phones. While sync protocols such as BitTorrent Sync7
are approaching an adequately straightforward way to
collate a lot of this data, it soon becomes clear that it is
not so straightforward in practice. Factors such as differ-
ent device capacities and capabilities mean that simply
copying all this data to all devices is not a viable pol-
icy even when simply managing one’s own data among
one’s own devices. However this limitation would also be
a security and privacy minimising option, as one would
at most have one or two strongly trusted – i.e., utilising
trusted hardware under the user’s full control – devices
with access to the complete index of the data, with all
other devices sending only limited queries to the trusted
sources.
WHERE IS MY DATABOX?
Having laid out motivation for Databox for all, and
briefly explored some of the requirements and practical-
ities, it is natural to next ask: so where is mine? There
have been several attempts to build systems that pro-
vide some or all of these features, but none have really
been successful. We believe that this is because there
are fundamental barriers, technical and social, that have
yet to be successfully addressed.
Availability. If the Databox is going to take such a cen-
tral place in our online lives, then we cannot afford for it
to become unreachable. This means that, as a network
connected device, my Databox must be (securely) acces-
sible no matter where I am; and it must also be itself
reliable and robust against loss of power, connectivity,
etc.
The limitations imposed by extensive use of firewalls,
NATs and other middlebox features in the current Inter-
net have pushed past approaches to focus on use of the
cloud to ensure connectivity under the assumption that
connectivity to Internet-hosted servers is more widely
available and reliable than connectivity between devices
at the edge of the network. Pushing all connectivity to
be via the cloud mitigates many of the problems intro-
duced by middleboxes but brings a host of other issues,
notably trust and cost.
Trust. This is a multi-faceted aspect of a system. Two
key aspects stand out: (i) the need to trust that the
7http://www.getsync.com/
Databox will protect the user against breach of data
due to, e.g., repeated queries or inference across differ-
ent datasets; and (ii) the need to trust that the soft-
ware running on the Databox is trustworthy and not
acting maliciously – open source and virtualization or
other sandboxing technologies, seem likely to have a key
role to play here.
More broadly, there is a need for uptake of such a ser-
vice to begin somewhere – how are the early adopters to
be encouraged to use the facility, and once they start,
how is this trust in the facility to be represented and
propagated to others. Early experiences with both past
attempts at personal data management systems as well
as others such as online social networks, also suggests
that trust in these systems is more complex than simply
providing perfect recall: while we might be happy for
our Databox to record everything perfectly in private,
we might expect it to “forget” data over time, at least
as far as others are concerned.
Complexity. Existing systems intended to help users
manage their personal data have found it difficult to con-
trol the associated complexity. User preferences in this
space are inherently complex: socially derived and con-
text dependent. They need to be expressed in machine-
readable form so that software can assist us in this man-
agement, while also capturing the very broad range of
intents and requirements. Two particular examples cap-
ture some of the inherent difficulties here. First, a three-
year German study ending in 20128 showed that the
more people disclosed about themselves on social me-
dia, the more privacy they said they desired. Sabine
Trepte (the lead author of the study) observed that the
paradox indicated dissatisfaction from the participants
with what they got in return for giving away so much
about themselves. And yet, she added, “they continued
to participate because they were afraid of being left out
or judged by others as unplugged and unengaged losers”.
Second, many data are inherently, rather than explicitly,
shared in that they implicate more than one individual.
Common examples include domestic energy consump-
tion data, and use of cloud email services such as Gmail:
even if a user opts out by choosing not to use Gmail,
there is a high chance9 that the recipient of their email
is using Gmail and so the sender cannot prevent Google
discovering the contents of their message. It is thus not
always clear who owns which piece of data or has the
right to grant permissions to a shared data item.
Usability. Related to the issue of complexity is that
of usability, one area in which the centralised platform
providers have excelled. The complexity that is inherent
to the systems being created needs to be made legible,
empowering end-users to understand the choices they
8http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/sunday-review/we-want-privacy-
9A 2014 analysis showed that “51% of the emails [that the
author] replied to arrived from Google.”, making hiding
information from Google impractical for the lay person,
http://mako.cc/copyrighteous/google-has-most-of-my-email-because-it-
have available and the consequences of their actions. A
successful Databox will need consistent user interaction
models and will enable developers of Databox applica-
tions to make use of these models. One area of inspi-
ration here might be the work done in the Homework
project which prototyped and, through a number of de-
ployments of several months each, studied use of several
novel task-specific interfaces assisting users in the com-
plex business of understanding and managing their home
broadband networks [19]. It is worth noting that the
high penetration of broadband and even larger adoption
of smartphones, individuals today are substantially more
sophisticated than the naive users of the past, and capa-
ble of embracing the data management capabilities of a
Databox. Moreover, due to large coverage of privacy and
personal data issues in the media, users may be seeking
out solutions like a Databox but without sacrificing the
user-experiences they have become familiar with.
Cost. As always, with a new facility such as a Databox,
there are a range of incentives that need to be aligned for
success. Operational costs of running a Databox have to
be acceptable to users. Coupled with this, the costs of
third-parties accessing the system, and potentially hav-
ing to recompense for access to data that previously they
would’ve simply gathered, will have to be recouped. It
remains to be seen how this can be done in practice:
Are users willing and able to pay in practice? What
will be the response of users when offered pay-for ver-
sions of previously free-to-use services? There is some
evidence that at least some users will be willing to make
this trade-off, but the same studies also show that the
situation is complex [24].
WHEN CAN I HAVE MY DATABOX?
Having made a case for each of us to have a Databox,
the only remaining question is when can we have it? In
a market-based economy, as ever, this requires the right
combination of sufficiently high demand and sufficiently
low cost that the need can be met. We are pursuing re-
duction in cost through development of associated tech-
nologies, including Nymote10 and its constituent compo-
nents including Mirage [14], Irmin [7] and Signpost [23].
In addition, we are developing methodologies for index-
ing and tracking the personal data held about us by third
parties.
However, the problem of demand highlights several un-
resolved challenges in this space: if, by and large, people
do not see the need for technologies like this unless and
until they suffer some kind of harm from a data breach,
it may remain difficult to reach sufficiently high levels
of demand; though this may change as public educa-
tion programs proceed to teach people about the poten-
tials and challenges of personal data. It is even possible
that governments will feel compelled to regulate to pro-
tect their citizens even before there is clear popular de-
mand: some have posited, for example, a need to change
10http://nymote.org
consent models from current practices of obtaining “in-
formed consent” (be it never so informed) to something
more akin to “consumer protection” (you do not give in-
formed consent to buy food from a supermarket – you
assume that the food on sale is generally fit for consump-
tion) [13].
From a technology design point of view, the general ap-
proach proposed is that of “privacy by design” (PbD):
it remains to be seen whether PbD can be successfully
implemented in a space such as this where policy and
technology need to co-evolve. Even then, there also
needs to be an explicit involvement of the social aspects:
it is unlikely that either state of everything-public or
everything-hidden is desirable for society. Ultimately,
the litmus test of success for personal data containers will
be their wide-scale adoption and operation. In order to
evaluate their effectiveness and the possibility of release
or sale of personal data, there needs to be a method
for determining the marginal rate of substitution11 for
personal data. The sale of personal data and the rich
insights and analytics derived from it is considered the
key utility in this ecosystem, and the individuals’ pref-
erences are the fundamental descriptors and success in-
dicators. Perhaps availability of such rich and indexed
data in one central aggregation point would enable one
to build a digital image of myself from the outside world
point of view, depending on what information is released
to which external actors.
Even observing a number of individuals using such a tool
in the wild will enable understanding of their real will-
ingness to pay for services, or marginal willingness to
pay for privacy. It has been argued that privacy is ne-
gotiated through collective dynamics, and hence society
reacts to the systems that are developed and released [9].
This calls for trial deployments and in-the-wild studies
of personal data containers in partnership with individ-
uals, in addition to successful negotiation with consumer
rights groups, privacy advocates, the advertising indus-
try, lawmakers, and regulators. Considering the churn
experienced in the personal data startup space, with a
number of new but typically short-lived entrants and of-
fering, it seems that few truly viable business models
have yet been discovered in this space. Our belief is that
the power of personal data can only be realised when
proper consideration is given to its social character, and
it can be legibly and negotiably combined with data from
external sources. In this case, we might anticipate many
potential business models [22].
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